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CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARD ON SPEECH-DISMISSAL OF PUBLIC EM-

United States Supreme Court
has held that in order for a county constable to terminate an employee for making a political remark on a matter of public concern,
PLOYEE-BALANCING APPROACH-The

it must be shown that the constable's interest in terminating the
employee outweighs the employee's first amendment rights.
Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S.Ct. 2891 (1987).
Ardith McPherson was hired as a deputy in the office of the constable of Harris County, Texas, on January 12, 1981.' Her duties
were purely clerical in nature, 2 and in the performance of her duties, McPherson never met the public.3 Her appointment as deputy
included a 90-day probationary period, 4 during which time the following incident took place.
On March 30, 1981, McPherson heard of the assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan on an office radio during the
lunch hour.5 She and a co-worker, her boyfriend,6 thereafter had a
brief, private discussion regarding the President's welfare and unemployment policies, with McPherson ending the conversation
with the statement: "I hope if they go for him (President Reagan)
again, they get him.' This remark was overheard by another deputy in the office, who in turn reported McPherson to Constable
Walter Rankin.' The constable summoned McPherson and ques1. Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2894 (1987), reh. denied, 108 S. Ct. 31
(1987).
2. Id. "[Respondent McPherson] was not a commissioned peace officer, did not wear a
uniform, and was not authorized to make arrests or permitted to carry a gun." Id.
3. Id. at 2895. McPherson's desk was in a room to which the public had no access, and
she had no telephone at her work station where the deputy typed data from court papers
into a computer. Id.
4. Id. at 2894. Tx. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2372h §1 (Vernon 1971), states that a county
officer [constable] "shall designate the employee for each such position and shall direct and
control the work or terminate the employment at the pleasure of such officer." Id.
5. McPherson v. Rankin, 736 F.2d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1984).
6. 107 S. Ct. at 2895.
7. 736 F.2d at 177. The precise phrasing of her comment differs in the record of the
circuit court, where at the summary judgment hearing she testified that she had said: "[I]f
they go for him again, I hope they get him." Id. at 177, n.2.
8. 107 S.Ct. at 2895. When McPherson made her statement to her boyfriend, she was
unaware that another deputy was present in the room at the time. Id. This fact is relevant
in regard to her intent as she spoke, a factor recognized by the circuit court of appeals in its
opinion. McPherson v. Rankin, 736 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1984). Judge Tate noted that when
the court must decide whether a public employee's private speech is protected by the first
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tioned her regarding her remark; their meeting resulted in her
termination.'
On June 5, 1981, Ardith McPherson brought an action in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,10 alleging that Rankin's dismissal of her
from her position had violated her constitutional rights under the
first and fourteenth amendments." Pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 56(a),
McPherson moved for a summary judgment 12 and Rankin responded by requesting a dismissal.'" The district court held an evidentiary hearing on February 14, 1983, to determine whether McPherson's speech was protected by the first amendment in this
instance. 4 The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Constable Rankin. 15 In its conclusions of law, the district court
set forth a three-step analysis which it used to determine whether
a public employee's speech is protected.' 6 The only question in issue was whether her statement was protected, and the court placed
amendment, "it is important to consider the context in which it is made, relevant considerations including the 'manner, time, and place in which it is delivered', and the intention of
the speaker." Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
9. 107 S.Ct. at 2895.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, [etc.] . . . of any state...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the person injured in an action of law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id.
11. 107 S.Ct. at 2895.
12. 736 F.2d at 177.
13. Id. Rankin claimed that McPherson had failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted under F.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
14. 736 F.2d at 177. At the evidentiary hearing, McPherson testified regarding her
intent in making the statement, claiming that she was only verbally expressing her anger
with President Reagan's social and economic policies. Id. at 178. McPherson offered an
analogy:
[Ilt is just like if I ask my sister to pick me up somewhere and she's late and I say,
'Where is she'. . . 'Wait till she get[s] here, I'm going to kill her.' That don't mean
I'm going to kill her with a gun or knife or weapon. It is an expression of
conversation.
Id.
15. Id. at 177.
16. McPherson v. Rankin, No. H-81-1442 (S.D. Tex. Apr.15, 1983) (order granting
summary judgment). This test asks three questions: (1) Is the communication protected?;
(2) If so, did it play a substantial part in the decision to fire the plaintiff?.; (3) If so, would
the employer have fired the employee even if the protected communication had not occurred? See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. Of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,286, (1977).
The Court used this test here. 736 F.2d at 179.
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the burden of establishing this protection on the plaintiff.1" Upon
balancing the plaintiff's right as a citizen to comment on a matter
of public concern 18 against the constable's interest in the execution
of his public duties, the court found Rankin's interest to be
superior.' 9
McPherson appealed and on July 12, 1984, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, on finding "the existence of substantial issues of
material fact, ' 20 vacated the district court's summary judgment
and remanded the case for a full trial on the merits.2 ' On remand,
the district court entered judgment for Constable Rankin and the
county, again holding that McPherson's statement was not protected speech.22
Deputy McPherson appealed again to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.2 3 This time, the court reversed and remanded "for determination of an appropriate remedy. ' ' 24 The attorneys for the
county and Constable Rankin petitioned for a writ of certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court, which was granted on October
20, 1986.25
The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed
the circuit court's judgment in favor of Deputy McPherson.2 , In
writing for the majority, Justice Marshall2 7 held that the deputy's
first amendment rights were paramount. 28 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Marshall reasoned that "[g]iven the function of the
agency, McPherson's position in the office, and the nature of her
statement, we are not persuaded that Rankin's interest in discharging her outweighed her rights under the First Amendment."2"
Justice Marshall utilized the "balancing of interests" test set
17. McPherson v. Rankin, No. H-81-1442.
18. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2896.
19. Id.
20. 736 F.2d at 180.
21. Id.
22. McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233, 1235 (5th Cir. 1986).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1239. The circuit court reasoned that "[hiowever ill-considered Ardith McPherson's opinion was, it did not make her unfit for her lowly job in Constable Rankin's
office." Id.
25. Rankin v. McPherson, 786 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 335 U.S. 632
(1986).
26. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2900.
27. Id. at 2894. Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Powell,
and Stevens herein. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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forth in Pickering v. Board of Education0 in holding that McPherson's first amendment rights were violated by her discharge.
He emphasized that such a balancing is necessary, albeit crucial, to
the protection of an employee as a citizen under the first amendment. "Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do
not use authority over employees to silence discourse, not because
it hampers public functions but simply because superiors disagree
with the content of employees' speech."'
Justice Marshall also relied on the case of Connick v. Myers3 2 for
its proposition that a statement by a public employee must be considered in its context by the Court to fully protect the employee's
interest. In Connick, the Court concluded that there is a constitutional obligation on the Court and its members to examine the
statements in question to determine whether they rise to the level
of protected speech under the first amendment."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell joined the opinion of the
Court, but remarked that it was unusual for this case to have
reached the Supreme Court of the United States.3 4 Justice Powell
emphasized that McPherson's comment was made with no intention that it be heard by anyone but her co-worker, and therefore,
he felt that the elaborate Pickering and Connick analyses were
3
unnecessary.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
30. 391 U.S. 563 (1969). In Pickering,the Court addressed the issue of whether a public employer had properly discharged an employee for exercising his freedom of speech. The
Court held that such a determination requires "a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees." Id.
31. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2896.
32. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
33. Id. at 150. The Court concluded that there is a constitutional obligation on the
Court and its members "to examine for [them]selves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they [were] made to see whether or not they . . .are of a character
which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, protect." Id., n.10 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,
335 (1946)).
34. Id. at 2900-01. Justice Powell wondered how this case had been considered "five
separate times by three different federal courts." Id. He acknowledged that although McPherson had made an ill-considered comment during a private conversation, that speech
was undoubtedly protected, and that the Constable's employment decision, on the basis of
her comment, was "intemperate." Id.
35. Id. at 2901. The Connick analysis requires that the comment be considered in its
context. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. Here, Justice Powell suggests that
the strictly private nature of the deputy's remark should have resolved the contextual issue
without further balancing analysis. Id. at 2897, n.7.

1988

Recent Decision

White and O'Connor, filed the dissenting opinion.3 6 The dissent
shared the reasoning of Constable Rankin's counsel.3 7 They restated the district judge's finding that McPherson's statement was
not "mere political hyperbole . . . [it was] . . . in context . . . violent words."3
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." 3 Over the course of its history, the first amendment
has served as the guardian of the right of the people to speak
freely. In New York Times v. Sullivan,0 the United States Supreme Court stated that:
[W]e must interpret the language Congress chose [in wording this amendment] against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
1
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.

The outcome of the Rankin case reflects the changes the courts
have made in their approach to first amendment issues involving
freedom of speech.
In the Rankin case, Deputy McPherson's statement was alleged
to be criminal in itself," by a 1917 federal statute that makes it a
felony for any person to "knowingly and willfully" make a threat
against the life of the President of the United States. 4 In Watts v.
36. Id. at 2901.
37. Id. at 2901-02. "No law enforcement agency is required by the First Amendment
to permit one of its employees to 'ride with the cops and cheer for the robbers.' " Brief for
Appellant at 94, Rankin v. McPherson, 786 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1986).
38. 107 S. Ct. at 2903, citing McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233, 1235 (5th Cir.
1986).
39.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

40. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
41. Id. at
42. Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. at 2903. Justice Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor. Id. at 2901.
43. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 871(a)(1917) provides that:
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for a delivery
from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive,
or document containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon
the President of the United States . .. or knowingly and willfully otherwise makes
any such threat against the President . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
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United States," the Supreme Court upheld this statute as being
"constitutional on its face,"'" but went on to caution that "[a] statute such as this one, which makes criminal a form of pure speech,
must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment
clearly in mind. What is a threat must be distinguished from what
46
is constitutionally protected speech.'

In the Watts case, the defendant had been drafted for duty in
Vietnam, and while at a public rally at the Washington Monument, he said: "I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle
the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. [President John-

son]." ' 47 The Court looked closely at this statement to see if there

was any apparent determination on defendant's part to carry the
threat into execution, reasoning that the government must prove a
true threat if any conviction is to stand.48 In concluding that
Watts' speech was mere "political hyperbole",' 9 the Court explained that "[t]aken in context, and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners,
we do not see how it could be interpreted otherwise. .

.

. [The]

only offense here was a kind of very crude offensive method of
stating a political opposition to the President." 0
The Court's reading of section 871(a) in Watts differs considerably from the rationale applied by the courts in two of the first
cases that arose under the statute. In United States v. Stickrath,1
the court upheld an indictment under section 871(a) against a defendant who had stated that "President Wilson ought to be killed.
It is a wonder someone has not done it already. If I had an oppor44. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
45. Id. at 707.
46. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas noted that 18 U.S.C. § 871 "was
passed in a 'relatively calm peacetime spring,' but has been construed under circumstances
when intolerance for free speech was much greater than it normally might be." Id. at 711.
See, Note, Threatening the President:Protected Dissenter or Potential Assassin, 57 GEo.
L.J. 553 (1969). The author notes that although Congress has made threats against the President's life a crime, "there is a danger...that the urgently felt need to protect the life of the
President will obscure the equally urgent need for free public debate in times of crisis." Id.
There must be a "clear and present danger." Id. at 562.
47. 394 U.S. at 706.
48. Id. at 708.
49. Id. Counsel for the petitioner, in his motion for an acquittal, offered to explain his
client's statement as a "kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition
to the President. What he was saying, he says, I don't want to shoot black people because I
don't consider them my enemy, and if they put the rifle in my hand, as symbolized by the
President, who are my real enemy." Id. at 707.
50. Id. at 708.
51. United States v. Stickrath, 242 F. 151 (S.D. Ohio 1917).
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tunity, I would do it myself.""3 Reacting strongly to Stickrath's remark, the court likened his speech to treason, and denounced his
statement "as a crime against the people as the sovereign power." 3
The Stickrath court read section 871(a) in a very objective and
broad manner, deciding that the word "ought", as uttered by the
defendant, denoted an "obligation of duty," ' and concluded that
'i]t is not the execution of such threat, or a continuing intent to
the offense, . . . but the making of it
execute it, that constitutes
6
knowingly and willfully."M
The objective standard employed in Stickrath was also employed in Ragansky v. United States" decided one year later. In
the Ragansky case, the court affirmed the defendant's section
871(a) conviction on the basis of his statement that:
we ought to make the biggest bomb in the world and take it down to the
White House and put it on the dome and blow up President Wilson and all
the rest of the crooks. . . . I would like to make a bomb big enough to blow
7
up the Capitol and President and all the Senators and everybody in it.5

Ragansky's defense, that it was merely a joke, was soundly rejected
on the grounds that one who "voluntarily uses language known by
him to be in form of such a threat, and who thus, to some extent
endangers the President's life,"" is guilty of the offense as charged.
52. Id. at 152.
53. Id. at 153. The court reasoned that the President is the chosen representative of
the people and that a threat against his life
stimulates opposition to national policies, however wise, even in the most critical
times, incites the hostile and evil-minded to take the President's life, adds to the
expense of his safeguarding, is an affront to all loyal and right-thinking persons, inflames their minds, provokes resentment, disorder, and violence, and is akin to
treason.
Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 154. The court determined that to do something "knowingly and willfully
implies, not only a knowledge of the thing, but a determination with a bad intent to do it
. ..If it [the threat] be thus made, the subsequent abandonment of the bad intent ...
does not obliterate the crime." Id. The opinion further noted that there is a greater
probability that "once set in motion the evil consequences resulting to the public from its
[the threatening statement's] promulgation . . .are vastly greater than the probabilities
that the threat will be carried out." Id.
56. Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643 (7th Cir. 1918).
57. Id. at 644.
58. Id. at 645. The court reasoned that:
[a] threat is knowingly [and willfully] made, if the maker of it comprehends the
meaning of the words uttered by him .. .[and] in addition to comprehending the
meaning of his words, the maker voluntarily and intentionally utters them as the
declaration of an apparent determination to carry them into execution.
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The court's use of the objective standard employed in Stickrath
and Ragansky was criticized by Justice Marshall in his concurring
9 The defendant in Rogers, an
opinion in Rogers v. United States.5
unemployed alcoholic, entered a coffee shop at a Holiday Inn and
announced that he was going to Washington, D.C. to "whip
Nixon's ass" or to "kill him [Nixon] in order to save the United
States."0 Rogers was arrested by the Secret Service and convicted
of violating section 871(a). 6' Both the district and the circuit
courts used an objective construction of the statute, as was done in
the Watts case.2 In applying this objective analysis, the courts
held that no intent to kill was needed for a section 871(a) conviction;63 rather, all that is needed is a mere showing that "a reasonable man in petitioner's place would have foreseen that the statements he made would be understood as indicating a serious
intention to commit the act.""
On certiorari in Rogers, the conviction was dismissed due to a
technical flaw in the jury verdict.6 5 In his concurrence, Justice
Marshall urged upon the Court a narrower reading of the statute. 6
Citing the House debates of 1917 regarding the passage of section
871(a), Justice Marshall discussed Congressmen Volstead and
Webb and their insistence that the word "willfully" be left in the
text of the statute.6 Justice Marshall attacked the oft-employed
so-called "objective" interpretation of section 871(a) by stating
that:
In essence, the objective interpretation embodies a negligence standard,
charging the defendant with responsibility for the effect of his statements
59. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 41-48 (1975).
60. Id. at 41-42.
61. Id.
62. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
63. Rogers, 422 U.S. at 43.
64. Id. at 43-44.
65. Id. at 44. The court's overly broad construction of section 871 was reflected in the
district court's jury charge. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 45-46. The two Congressmen were vehemently opposed to the suggestion
that the word "willfully" be stricken from the statute. 53 CONG. REc. 9378 (1916). Mr. Volstead urged that "if this statute is to be saved at all, it seems to me it must be upon the
theory that the act is willful." Id. (emphasis added). There is nothing in the language
outside of that word to convey the idea that a threat must be an intentional threat against
the President. Id. The word "willful" conveys, as ordinarily used, the idea of wrongful as
well as intentional. Id. That idea ought to be preserved so as not to make innocent acts
punishable." Id. at 9379. Congressman Webb added that, "I do not think we ought to be too
anxious to convict a man who does a thing thoughtlessly. I think it ought to be a willful
expression of an intent to carry out a threat against the Executive...". Id. at 9378.
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on his listeners. We have long been reluctant to infer that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes. .. We should be particularly wary
of adopting such a standard for a statute that regulates pure speech.68

Justice Marshall concluded that "§ 871 . . . require[s] proof that
the speaker intended his statement to be taken as a threat, even if
he had no intention of actually carrying it out. The proof of intention would, of course, almost certainly turn on the circumstances
under which the statement was made."' 9
In light of these cases, and the historic position of the Court, it
is evident why the district court in Rankin concluded that Deputy
McPherson's statement did not amount to a threat against the life
of President Reagan under section 871(a). "A state would. . . face
considerable obstacles if it sought to criminalize the words that
70
were uttered by McPherson on the day the President was shot.1
McPherson made the statement during a private conversation, not
intending that anyone but her boyfriend hear it.7 1 It is important
to note here that the private nature of her statement does not strip
it of its constitutional protection, 72 as it addresses a matter of pub73
lic concern.
At this point in the analysis, a brief explanation of Pickering v.
Board of Education74 is appropriate. In Pickering, a high school
teacher was dismissed by the Board of Education of Will County,
Illinois, for the publication of a letter to the editor of a local news68. Rogers, 422 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
70. Rankin v. McPherson, 786 F.2d at 1235.
71. Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. at 2895.
72. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979). In this case,
the Court disregarded any distinction between the public or private nature of an employee's
comment for the purposes of applying a Pickering balancing analysis. Id. at 414. The Court
stated:
This Court's decisions in Pickering [etc.] . . . do not support the conclusion that a
public employee forfeits his protection against government abridgement of freedom of
speech if he decides to express his views privately rather than publicly. While those
cases each arose in the context of a public employee's public expression, the rule to
be derived from them is not dependent on that largely coincidental fact.
Id. (emphasis added).
73. Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. at 2897-98.
Considering the statement in context, as Connick requires, discloses that it plainly
dealt with a matter of public concern. The statement was made in the course of a
conversation addressing the policies of the President's administration. . .on the heels
of a news bulletin regarding what is certainly a matter of heightened public attention:
an attempt on the life of the President.
Id.
74. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
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paper.78 The teacher's letter criticized the school board's proposed
allocation of tax funds, and as such, the board decided that Pickering's letter was "detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools," and that "the interests of the school require[d] [the teacher's dismissal]. ' 6 Pickering claimed that his
first amendment right to freedom of speech had been violated.77
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, 8 but Justice Marshall, writing for the United States Supreme Court,79 reversed the Illinois
decision, thereby upholding the teacher's constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech.8 0 The Court in Pickering was concerned
with balancing the rights of a public employee, as a citizen, to
speak freely about public issues, against the rights of the state, as
an employer, to promote "the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees."8 1 Justice Marshall emphasized
that public employment, though it is a benefit which may be altogether denied, may not be subjected to any unreasonable conditions.8 " He noted that by threatening dismissal from public employment, a state wields a powerful means of inhibiting free speech
by its employees.8 3 Therefore, since the teacher's comment was in
75. Id.
76. Id. at 564-65. The Court soundly rejected the Board's contention regarding the
letter:
The statements are in no way directed towards any person with whom appellant
would normally contact in the course of his daily work . . . [there is] no question of
maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers
• . . [therefore] to the extent that the Board's position here [suggests that] comments
on matters of public concern . . . may furnish grounds for dismissal if they are sufficiently critical in tone, we unequivocally reject it.
Id. at 569-70.
77. Id. at 565.
78. Id.
79. Id. Joining Justice Marshall in the majority were Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Fortas. Justices Black and Douglas concurred.
80. Id. at 575.
81. Id. at 568.
82. Id. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See also Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 582 (1972). In Roth, Justice Douglas dissented as follows:
"When a violation of First Amendment rights is alleged, the reasons for dismissal or for
nonrenewal of an employment contract must be examined to see if the reasons given are
only a cloak for activity or attitudes protected by the Constitution." Roth, 408 U.S. at 582.
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented independently. Id.
83. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. Justice Marshall stated that:
In a case such as the present one, in which the fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of the public communication
. . .we conclude that it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the
general public he seeks to be.
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regard to a matter of public concern, and did not interfere with the
state-as-employer's interest in efficiency, the "balance" was tilted
in favor of the teacher's fundamental right of free speech. As such,
the Supreme Court held that the "exercise of [the] right to speak
on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for...
dismissal from public employment."' "
It is clear that the Pickering analysis served to uphold Deputy
McPherson's right to speak as a public employee.8 5 One point
touched upon, however, but not fully addressed in Pickering, was
the lack of interference the public employee's speech caused in the
work environment.8s The fifth circuit explained the factor of job
interference in Smith v. United States,17 wherein the court stated
that "[in order for the government to constitutionally remove an
employee from government service for exercising the right of free
speech, it is incumbent upon [the state] to clearly demonstrate
that the employee's conduct substantially and materially interferes with the discharge of duties and responsibilities inherent in
such employment."88
In determining the degree of interference caused by the employee's speech, and thereby adjusting the "interest-balance", the
statement made must not be considered in a vacuum; the manner,
place, and time of the employee's speech are all relevant factors.89
Here, then, it is evident that Deputy McPherson's statement was
not a substantial and material interference with her duties. Her
remark was made in a private conversation in an area of the constable's office to which the public had no access; it was not meant
for anyone else to hear.' 0 The Court concluded that "[n]ot only
was McPherson's discharge unrelated to the functioning of the office, it was not based on any assessment by the Constable that the
84. Id.
85. Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. at 2896. Justice Marshall cautioned that
"[v]igilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply because superiors disagree with the content of employees' speech." Id.
86. See McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d at 1238. The circuit court, on reversing and
remanding in McPherson's favor, emphasized that her comment was made to "a coworker
who, with the benefit of the remark's full context, was not offended." Id. (emphasis added).
The court continued by stating that"Constable Rankin specifically denied having fired [McPherson] because of any disruption caused by her comment, and the evidence did not show
that the remark threatened the future efficiency or morale of the office." Id.
87. Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1974).
88. Id. at 517 (emphasis added).
89. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2898.
90. Id. at 2899.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 27:185

remark demonstrated a character trait that made [her] unfit to
perform her work."' In addition, the strictly clerical nature of McPherson's work lessened even further the impact
her private
92
office.
the
of
functioning
the
on
have
speech could
It is important to note that the probationary nature of McPherson's job does not shift the balance in favor of the state-employer.93 In Perry v. Sindermanne4 , a non-tenured college professor's contract was not renewed by the university's Board of
Regents because the professor had publicly criticized the college's
administrative policies-a criticism deemed an "insubordination"
by the Board. 95 The Board of Regents successfully argued to the
district court that the professor had no first amendment claim because he lacked tenure and/or a contract.9 In reversing this decision, the circuit court of appeals held that the lack of the existence
of tenure or an employment contract did not defeat the professor's
claim because "[the government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech.. . . [L]ack of a
contractual or tenure 'right' to re-employment. . . is immaterial to
' 97
his free speech claim.

More recent cases have drawn the line of defining when a statement addresses an issue of public concern.98 In Connick v. Myers99 ,
a former assistant district attorney brought suit against her employer, claiming that dismissal from her position violated her right
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2900. Justice Marshall noted:
Where, as here, an employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public contact
role, the danger to the agency's successful function from that employee's private
speech is minimal . . .[at] some point, such concerns are so removed from the effective function of the public employer that they cannot prevail over the free speech
rights of the public employee.

Id.
93. Id. at 2896.
94. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
95. Id. at 595.
96. Id. at 596.
97. Id. at 597-98.
98. Pickering,391 U.S. at 571-72. A "matter of legitimate public concern" is one upon
which "free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate." Id. If a
statement does not address a matter of public concern, it does not receive the benefit of the
balancing test. Id.
99. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See also Yoggerst v. Stewart, 571 F. Supp.
68 (D.C. Ill. 1983) (state agency employee's statement over the phone to a fellow employee
that it was "good news" that their supervisor had been terminated was not protected as it
did not involve a matter of public concern).

Recent Decision

1988

of free speech. 0 Upon learning of her impending involuntary
transfer to another department in her office, Myers circulated a
questionnaire to her fellow employees regarding "office transfer
policy, office morale, the need for [an office] grievance committee,
the level of confidence in the supervisors, and whether employees
felt pressured to work in political campaigns."'' Though successful in the trial and appellate courts, on certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court her claim was rejected; the Supreme Court
found that her questionnaire did not address a matter of public
concern, and therefore, her speech was not protected by the first
amendment. 02
The sentiment held by the Court, reflected in its application of
the Pickering balancing approach to public employees' first
amendment rights, embodies the rationale of the landmark case of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.0 3 A public employee is, first and
foremost, a United States citizen, and therefore, has a constitutional right to comment upon matters of public concern. 0 4 By accepting government employment, an individual does not accept a
corresponding limitation on his inherent right to speak. So long as
a public employee's speech does not interfere with the functioning
or discipline of his own work or that of his fellow employees, the
state has no interest in preventing that speech or dismissing that
employee. 0 5 As evidenced by the Court's decision in Rankin v.
McPherson, the first amendment's guarantee of the freedom of
100.

Connick, 461 U.S. at 140.

101. Id.
102. Id. at 145. The Court reasoned: "When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,
government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Id. (emphasis added).
Myers' questionnaire herein addressed inner-office politics, and as such, merited no constitutional protection. Id.
103. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Brennan wrote
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government officials.
Id. at 270. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
104. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 144. The Court cited NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), stating: "[T]he Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on
public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values', and is
entitled to special protection." Id. But see 107 S. Ct. at 2900, n.18. "This is not to say that
clerical employees are insulated from discharge where their speech, taking the acknowledged
factors into account, truly injures the public interest in the effective functioning of the public employer." Id.
105. Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2900.
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speech remains a strong safeguard of the people.

Susan Gerhold

